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Is ARC-CO acting as a Safety Net Program? 
Evidence from Iowa
by Alejandro Plastina and Chad Hart
plastina@iastate.edu; chart@iastate.edu
THE AGRICULTURAL Act of 2014, referred to as the 2014 Farm Bill, is the legislative backbone of 
federal farm income support programs 
and agricultural disaster assistance 
programs. These programs, combined 
with federal crop insurance, are what is 
typically referred to as the farm safety 
net. As the debate has begun for the 
next version of the Farm Bill, policy 
discussions have centered on improving 
the effectiveness of the safety net. 
However, in previous Farm Bills, there 
had been a concerted effort to utilize 
decoupled agricultural support to ensure 
that US farm programs would meet World 
Trade Organization (WTO) standards. 
The commodity programs in the 1996 
and 2002 Farm Bills were led by the 
direct payment programs—essentially 
ϐixed decoupled payments that ϐlowed to 
agricultural producers, regardless of the 
agricultural economy. In the 2008 and 
2014 Farm Bills, commodity programs 
were modiϐied to react to conditions in 
the agricultural economy. Congress must 
determine how to balance decoupled 
agricultural programs, which are less 
responsive to the agricultural economy 
but more accepted in the WTO, against 
safety net agricultural programs, which 
are more responsive but also seen as 
more trade distorting. 
Current commodity programs 
include the Price Loss Coverage (PLC) 
and the Agricultural Risk Coverage 
(ARC) programs. PLC provides payments 
when low prices occur and it can be 
considered a price safety net program. 
The ARC program at the Individual Level 
(ARC-IC) provides coverage against low 
income for an operation, and it can also 
be considered a farm revenue safety net 
program. The ARC program at the County 
Level (ARC-CO) is based on area revenue, 
decoupled from farm yields and prices. 
ARC-CO can be considered a revenue 
safety net program, but given the 
decoupling from farm yields and prices, 
its effectiveness is an open question. In 
fact, ARC-CO can be characterized as a 
lottery of government payments with 
probability of payment less than one, 
equal prizes per base acre within each 
county, and great variability in prizes 
across county lines. However, ARC-CO 
is a very popular program. Base acres 
enrolled in ARC-CO account for 75 
percent of total program base acres 
in the nation. Furthermore, 92 and 96 
percent of corn and soybean base acres 
are enrolled in the ARC-CO program. 
The accumulated ARC-CO payments for 
corn and soybean base acres in 2015 
and 2016 amount to nearly $9.2 billion, 
and represent 89 percent of all ARC-CO 
payments for all covered commodities, 
and 71 percent of all ARC-CO and PLC 
payments in the nation over the same 
period. Many farmers, in essence, traded 
the direct payment program for ARC-
CO. Did their trade result in a better 
safety net for agriculture? Plastina and 
Hart (2018) explore this question by 
analyzing the distribution of ARC-CO 
payments across different groups of 
mid-sized commercial Iowa farms with 
different income levels, proϐit levels, 
as well as liquidity and solvency levels. 
We summarize the evidence pointing 
towards a disconnection between ARC-CO 
payments and farm incomes and proϐits 
reported in Plastina and Hart (2018).
The database contains nearly 700 
observations of mid-sized commercial 
farms actively managed from 55 of 
Iowa’s 99 counties, and all agricultural 
districts in Iowa, and covers the 
production and ϐinancial aspects of the 
farms. Each point in the database is a 
farm-year combination and accounts 
for ARC-CO payments made in 2015 and 
2016 (corresponding, respectively, to 
crop years 2014/15 and 2015/16). 
ARC-CO Payments by Crop Income
Table 1 shows the descriptive statistics 
of ARC-CO payments per acre by 
crop income (accrued) per acre in 
the previous year for all farm-year 
combinations (those that received or 
did not receive payments). Per acre 
incomes and payments are examined 
to remove the effect of farm size from 
the analysis. The median payment 
for all categories was zero, and the 
average payments tended to increase 
with the level of crop income in the 
previous year. This is counterintuitive 
for a safety net program, as one would 
likely expect lower incomes to be paired 
with higher program payments. A 
pairwise comparison of average ARC-CO 
payments for all farm-year combinations 
(those that received or did not receive 
payments) across groups of farms using 
Tukey’s Studentized Range (HSD) tests 
at the ϐive percent conϐidence level, 
which indicates that: (a) farms with the 
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largest crop income per acre (>$800) 
received signiϐicantly higher ARC-CO 
payments per acre than farms with up to 
$600 in crop income per acre—$9.16 vs. 
$1.84, respectively; (b) farms with crop 
income between $700 and $800 per acre 
received signiϐicantly higher ARC-CO 
payments per acre than farms with up 
to $600 in crop income per acre—$7.30 
vs. $1.84, respectively. All other pairwise 
comparisons across groups of farms with 
known crop incomes in the previous 
years are not statistically signiϐicant.
Table 2 shows the descriptive 
statistics of ARC-CO payments by crop 
income (accrued) in the previous year 
only for those farm-year combinations 
that received payments. A similar pattern 
to that in Table 1 is observed, as average 
payments tend to increase with the 
level of crop income in the previous 
year. A pairwise comparison of average 
ARC-CO corn and soybean payments 
per acre across farms grouped by crop 
income in the previous year using HSD 
Table 1. ARC-CO Corn and Soybean Payments per Operated Crop Acre by 
Crop Income per Acre in Previous Year for All Farm-year Combinations
Table 2. ARC-CO Corn and Soybean Payments per Operated Crop Acre by 
Crop Income per Acre in Previous Year For Farm-year Combinations That 
Received Payments in 2015 and 2016
tests at the ϐive percent conϐidence level 
indicates that: (a) the average payment 
for the group of farms with more than 
$800 in crop income per acre, $53.22, 
is signiϐicantly larger than the average 
payment received by farms with crop 
income up to $600 per acre, $24.08, and 
farms with crop income between $600 
and $700 per acre, $33.49; (b) average 
payments for the three groups of farms 
with up to $800 in crop income per acre 
($24.08, $33.49, and $37.26) are not 
signiϐicantly different among themselves.
Since ARC-CO payments tend to 
increase with crop incomes in the 
previous year, the ARC-CO program seems 
to fail at protecting farmers against low 
incomes. In fact, operators with higher 
incomes are the ones who tend to capture 
the higher payments under ARC-CO. 
ARC-CO Payments by Crop Profi ts
Crop proϐits are calculated by subtracting 
accrued operating expenses and 
economic depreciation (on machinery 
and equipment and buildings and 
improvements) from crop income 
(accrual). Proϐits equal the net farm 
income that is used to compensate unpaid 
family labor, plus returns to equity and 
management. As with crop incomes, the 
crop proϐits are examined on a per acre 
basis to remove farm size effects.
Table 3 shows the descriptive 
statistics of ARC-CO payments by crop 
proϐits in the previous year for all 
farm-year combinations. The median 
payment for all categories was zero. 
A pairwise comparison of average 
ARC-CO payments for all farm-year 
combinations across groups of farms 
using HSD tests at the ϐive percent 
conϐidence level indicates that: (a) the 
average payment for the group of farms 
with crop proϐits larger than $150 per 
acre, $12.67, is signiϐicantly larger than 
the corresponding averages for the four 
groups of farms with proϐits up to $100 
per acre—$3.08, $5.39, $4.43, $and 
$3.60; (b) the average payment for the 
group of farms with crop proϐits between 
$100 and $150 per acre is signiϐicantly 
larger than the corresponding average 
for the group of farms with crop losses 
of up to $50 per acre—$11.19 vs. 
$3.08, respectively. All other pairwise 
comparisons across groups of farms 
with known crop proϐits in the previous 
years are not statistically signiϐicant. 
Once again, the results are generally the 
opposite of what one would expect from 
a safety net program. Those farmers with 
the lowest crop proϐits (or largest crop 
losses) tended to receive less from ARC-
CO than farmers with better proϐitability.
Table 4 shows the descriptive 
statistics of ARC-CO payments by 
crop proϐits in the previous year only 
for those farm-year combinations 
that received payments. A pairwise 
comparison of average ARC-CO corn 
and soybean payments across farms 
grouped by crop proϐits fails to ϐind 
signiϐicant differences using HSD tests 
continued on page 13
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USDA’s Projections for 2018
continued from page 7
 Can China’s Rural Land Policy Reforms Solves its 
Farmland Dilemma?
continued from page 9
Key Policies Governing Land Use 
and Conversion in China
 The “Redline” of farmland is 
the lowest limit of arable land 
in 2020, about 300 million 
acres, set by the Chinese 
government in 2006.
 Permanent basic cropland 
is the 255 million acres of 
designated high cropland 
that is subjected to stricter 
protection from conversion to 
urban use.
 The “Increase-decrease 
linkage” policy  (started 
in 2006) allows local 
governments to convert 
certain amounts of arable 
land to urban uses if they 
create an equal or larger 
amount of arable land from 
rural construction land (e.g. 
farmhouses).
 The “Grain for green” 
(started in 1999) policy 
returns marginal farmland in 
ecologically sensitive areas to 
forestry.
numbers for 2018 are encouraging. 
Table 4 displays USDA’s projections and, 
as with production, the numbers are 
higher across the board. Both pork and 
beef enjoyed roughly 10 percent export 
growth in 2017. Beef is expected to gain 
another four percent in 2018, while 
pork is projected to grow ϐive percent 
during the year. Broiler and turkey 
exports are expected to grow as well.
Thus, the underlying agricultural 
story for 2018 may be due to the global 
demand for meat. Currently, the surge 
in meat consumption globally has 
improved livestock market returns 
and led to signiϐicant increases in 
production. That is, in turn, providing 
support for the crop markets, at a time 
when those markets need a usage 
boost. Combined, the projections 
indicate a slight improvement in the 
US agricultural economy, but the 
emphasis is on the word “slight.” Price 
improvement is a hard thing to come by 
when records continue to be set on the 
production side.
more ϐirms into agriculture and further 
boost productivity. Studies have found 
that land productivity dramatically 
increases after transfers (e.g., by 60 
percent according to Jin and Klaus’ 
2009 estimate). Overall, we believe the 
recent developments in China’s land 
policy are pushing both crop and animal 
production toward larger scales.
Data Sources and References:




China Agricultural Development Report 2016 
(Chinese)
China Statistical Yearbook. 2007. (Chinese) 
http://www.stats.gov.cn/tjsj/ndsj/2017/
indexch.htm
Chinaidr.com. 2018. “The Current 
Upscale Operations in Chinese 
Agriculture and Future Development.” 
(Chinese) http://www.chinaidr.com/
tradenews/2018-01/117465.html
Chongqing Municipal Government. 2016. The 
Methods to Administrate Land Tickets. 
(Chinese)
Food and Agriculture Organization of the 
United Nations (FAO). 2018. Land Use Data 
http://www.fao.org/faostat/en/#data/RL
Ministry of Agriculture (MOA). 2018. “Current 
Rural Operation and Management.”
http://www.jgs.moa.gov.cn/txjsxxh/201801/
t20180105_6134218.htm
Southern Weekend. 2010. “Forcing 
Farmer into High-rise Buildings may be 
Unconstitutional.” 
http://www.infzm.com/content/52105
State Council. 2004. “State Council’s Decision 
to Deepen Reform and to Apply Stricter 
Land Management.” http://www.gov.cn/
zwgk/2005-08/12/content_22138.htm
United Nations Population Division. 2017. 
“World Population Prospects 2017.” 
https://esa.un.org/unpd/wpp/Download/
Standard/Population/ 
United States Department of Agriculture 
Foreign Agriculture Service. 2017. “China: 
Livestock and Products Semi-annual.” 
https://www.fas.usda.gov/data/china-
livestock-and-products-semi-annual-2
Zhang, W. and M. Li. 2018. “Navigating the 
Chinese Agricultural Economy through the 
Lens of Iowa.” Ag Decision Maker, February 
2018. 
3
Plastina and Hart: Is ARC-CO acting as a Safety Net Program? Evidence from Iowa
Published by Iowa State University Digital Repository, 2019
Agricultural Policy Review / 13
at the ϐive percent conϐidence level. This 
slightly modiϐies the previous pattern, 
as once ARC-CO payments are triggered, 
they are roughly shared equally across 
the proϐit spectrum. In terms of crop 
proϐitability, the ARC-CO payments act 
more like decoupled payments in those 
counties where payments are triggered, 
and less like a safety net for all farms. 
Conclusions
Using farm-level data from Iowa, we 
found no support to the hypotheses 
that ARC-CO payments would be larger 
for farms with lower incomes or lower 
proϐits. On the contrary, we found 
support that ARC-CO payments tend 
to be larger for farms with higher crop 
incomes and proϐits in the previous year. 
In summ ary, ARC-CO payments, instead 
of acting as a safety net for Iowa farmers, 
can be more accurately characterized as 
decoupled support for farms located in 
counties where payments are triggered, 
but without the consistency of previous 
programs, such as the direct payment 
program. In the end, farmers traded the 
certainty of the direct payment program 
for a lottery of government payments 
with probability of payment less than 
one, equal prizes per base acre within 
each county and great variability in 
prizes across county lines.
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